Jackson y la mejora interna - Historia

Jackson y la mejora interna - Historia

El presidente Andrew Jackson estaba en conflicto acerca de sus posiciones sobre la "mejora interna". Apoyó la idea en teoría. Sin embargo, Jackson cuestionó tanto el costo de estas mejoras como si era constitucional que el gobierno federal apoyara las mejoras internas. Al principio de su mandato, Jackson vetó un proyecto de ley que habría autorizado la construcción de lo que se llamó "Maysville Road". Mayville Road iba a ser parte de un sistema nacional de carreteras más grande. El camino debía pasar por la ciudad natal de Henry Clay, uno de los rivales políticos de Jackson. La ubicación de la carretera propuesta no afectó el entusiasmo de Jackson por el veto. El mensaje de veto de Jackson fue lo suficientemente ambiguo como para ser bien recibido. El presidente Jackson declaró que estaba a favor de las mejoras, pero de mejoras que fueran por el bien nacional, y no meramente por el bien seccional. Jackson también quería asegurarse de que el gobierno no creciera demasiado. Por lo tanto, Jackson sostuvo que la participación nacional en las mejoras debería ser limitada.

La ambigüedad de Jackson sobre la cuestión de la mejora le sirvió de mucho. No estableció criterios claros. Así pudo aprobar o desaprobar proyectos basados, no solo en el bien nacional, sino más bien en sus necesidades políticas del momento. A pesar de la inclinación de Jackson a no apoyar la participación del gobierno federal en los proyectos de mejora interna, los proyectos financiados por el gobierno federal aumentaron rápidamente durante su presidencia.


Andrew Jackson y la Constitución

En 1860, el biógrafo James Parton llegó a la conclusión de que Andrew Jackson era "un ciudadano sumamente desafiante y obediente de la ley". Evidentemente, tal afirmación es contradictoria. Sin embargo, captura con precisión la esencia del famoso o infame Jackson. Sin lugar a dudas, el séptimo presidente fue un hombre de contradicciones. Hasta el día de hoy, los historiadores no han podido llegar a conclusiones aceptadas sobre su carácter o impacto en la nación. ¿Era él, como ha argumentado Robert Remini en las páginas de más de una docena de libros, el gran líder y símbolo de una floreciente democracia de masas? ¿O era Jackson simplemente un matón vanaglorioso sin visión de la nación, reaccionando en respuesta a su propio orgullo sensible, como han insistido Andrew Burstein y otros?

Hay mucho que uno puede ver en la vida de Jackson cuando se intenta llegar a conclusiones. En particular, su relación con la ley y la Constitución ofrecen una ventana significativa a su cosmovisión. Ya sea declarando ilegalmente la ley marcial en Nueva Orleans, invadiendo la Florida española y ejecutando a ciudadanos británicos, retirando depósitos federales del Banco de los Estados Unidos o cuestionando la autoridad de la Corte Suprema en Worcester contra GeorgiaJackson actuó de una manera que a veces era claramente ilegal, pero que los partidarios lo aclamaban ampliamente como lo mejor para la nación. Y antes de concluir que este apoyo fue una broma partidista otorgada por su propio Partido Demócrata, debemos recordar que los historiadores y eruditos legales hasta el día de hoy han luchado con el significado ideológico y constitucional más amplio de las creencias y acciones de Jackson. Una cosa es cierta: Jackson no tuvo reparos en traspasar la ley, incluso la Constitución, cuando creía que la supervivencia misma de la nación lo requería. Además, esta perspectiva permanece en el centro del debate en un Estados Unidos posterior al 11 de septiembre. La pregunta esencial permanece: ¿puede un líder violar la ley para finalmente salvarlo a él y a la nación?

La fama de Andrew Jackson llegó con la Batalla de Nueva Orleans en 1814 y 1815, donde demolió un ejército británico experimentado sin prácticamente ninguna pérdida para sus tropas. La victoria lanzó al general al estrellato nacional y finalmente a la presidencia. Sin embargo, había cuestiones constitucionalmente delicadas que se avecinaban bajo la superficie de esta victoria, a saber, la suspensión de Jackson del recurso de hábeas corpus y la declaración de la ley marcial. El primero fue autorizado por la Constitución, pero la Corte Suprema había determinado que solo el Congreso podía suspender el privilegio del auto, lo que permitía que un juez "llevara un cuerpo" ante el tribunal, lo que imposibilitaba que una autoridad de arresto (la policía o militar) para retener a una persona por tiempo indefinido sin presentar cargos. Jackson suspendió la orden judicial de todos modos, y fue aún más lejos al imponer la ley marcial, que canceló toda autoridad civil y colocó a los militares en control. El acto fue totalmente ilegal. No existía ninguna disposición en la Constitución que autorizara tal edicto. El problema fue que la ley marcial salvó a Nueva Orleans y la victoria misma salvó el orgullo de la nación. Después de varios años de tristes encuentros militares durante la Guerra de 1812 y el incendio de la capital de la nación en el verano de 1814, nadie, especialmente el presidente Madison, estaba de humor para investigar, y mucho menos para castigar, la victoria del general Jackson. conducta ilegal. Por lo tanto, Jackson se alejó del evento con dos convicciones duraderas: una, que la victoria y el nacionalismo generado por ella protegieron sus acciones, incluso si fueran ilegales y dos, que podía hacer lo que quisiera si lo consideraba en el mejor interés de la nación.

Las condenas de Jackson entraron en juego solo tres años después, en 1818, cuando el indomable general excedió sus órdenes de proteger la frontera de Georgia al cruzar a la Florida española, donde invadió dos ciudades y ejecutó a dos ciudadanos británicos por hacer la guerra a los Estados Unidos. Una vez más, las acciones de Jackson fueron cuestionables, si no totalmente ilegales. Básicamente, hizo la guerra a España sin la aprobación del Congreso, traspasó sus propios límites como comandante y ejecutó sumariamente a dos hombres, lo que muy bien podría haber incitado dificultades legales y militares con Gran Bretaña y España. Sin embargo, la conducta de Jackson fue una vez más vista por muchos, incluido él mismo, como una defensa necesaria de la nación. Los españoles no habían hecho nada para evitar que los indios seminolas merodeadores cruzaran la frontera y atacaran las granjas estadounidenses. Por lo tanto, las acciones del general fueron justificadas como autodefensa nacional por el secretario de Estado John Quincy Adams, el único miembro del gabinete del presidente Monroe que apoyó a Jackson. Adams aprovechó la confusión provocada por el incidente para convencer a España de que deberían vender Florida por unos miserables 5 millones de dólares.

A diferencia del uso de la ley marcial por parte de Jackson en Nueva Orleans, el Congreso debatió el comportamiento deshonesto de Jackson en Florida, y Henry Clay anunció que el general era un "jefe militar" y peligroso para una república joven. Aunque los legisladores discutieron sobre el asunto, no resultó nada significativo, excepto que Jackson se convirtió en una figura cada vez más polarizante, particularmente debido a sus aspiraciones políticas. Cuando se postuló a la presidencia en 1824, los críticos desataron un torrente de abusos, gran parte de ellos centrados en sus costumbres anárquicas. Jackson se vio obligado a responder y comentó específicamente sobre sus violaciones de la Constitución. Señaló que algunos en la nación creían que él era “el hombre más peligroso y terrible. . . . y que puedo romper y pisotear la constitución del país, con tanta despreocupación e indiferencia descuidada, como lo haría uno de nuestros cazadores, si de repente se le ubica en Gran Bretaña, violaría las leyes de caza ". Continuó, “ha sido mi suerte a menudo estar en situaciones de tipo crítico” que “me impusieron la necesidad de Violar, o más bien apartarme de la constitución del país, pero en ningún período posterior me ha producido una sola punzada, creyendo, como lo creo ahora, y entonces creí, que sin ella, no se podría haber obtenido la seguridad ni para mí ni para la gran causa que se me había confiado ”.

La convicción ideológica de Jackson sobre la naturaleza flexible de la ley y la Constitución frente a los peligros que enfrenta la nación todavía incipiente se puede ver en muchas batallas jacksonianas posteriores. Cuando el presidente Jackson se enfrentó al Banco de los Estados Unidos en 1832, lo hizo con la creencia de que era un monstruo fiscal corrupto que amenazaba la seguridad económica de la nación. No solo vetó la reubicación del Banco, que estaba dentro de su derecho como director ejecutivo, sino que dio un paso más al eliminar los depósitos federales incluso después de que el Congreso los considerara seguros. Jackson transfirió a un secretario del Tesoro y despidió a otro para asegurar la remoción de depósitos. Sus acciones fueron cuestionables, si no completamente ilegales, y el Senado lo censuró haciendo una anotación en su diario. No intentaron un juicio político por falta de apoyo.

Surgieron otros conflictos legales. Jackson supuestamente desafió a la Corte Suprema por Worcester contra Georgia (1832), anunciando: "John Marshall ha tomado su decisión, ahora déjele hacerla cumplir". El caso giró en torno al intento de Georgia de aplicar las leyes estatales a las tierras Cherokee. El Tribunal falló en contra de la autoridad de Georgia para hacerlo y Jackson, dedicado a la expulsión de indios, supuestamente impugnó a Marshall. Aunque hay poca evidencia para apoyar la cita anterior, ciertamente suena a Jackson. No obstante, el caso no requirió nada de Jackson y finalmente se resolvió fuera de los tribunales. El hecho es, sin embargo, que en este caso y en McCulloch contra Maryland (1819), cuando se dictaminó que el Banco de los Estados Unidos era de hecho constitucional, Jackson desafió la autoridad de la Corte como árbitro final. Como presidente, Jackson creía que su autoridad para considerar lo constitucional equivalía a la de la Corte Suprema.

Las opiniones de Jackson con respecto a los indígenas estadounidenses también desafiaron la ley. Los tratados fueron y siguen siendo acuerdos legales entre naciones soberanas. Sin embargo, Jackson se negó a creer que las tribus nativas americanas fueran soberanas y, por lo tanto, consideró los tratados indios como un absurdo. Al final, sacó por la fuerza de sus hogares a varias tribus, la más notoria la Cherokee. The Trail of Tears es uno de los legados más infames de Jackson. Sin embargo, incluso la eliminación y las cuestiones de soberanía tribal encajan en un contexto más amplio de las convicciones de Jackson con respecto a la seguridad nacional y la soberanía estatal. El ascenso del general se debió a su éxito como luchador indio en la frontera. Siempre, y hasta cierto punto legítimamente, vio a los indios americanos como una seria amenaza para los colonos. Como presidente, Jackson comprendió el sentimiento de los estados del sur y su concepción de que los estados no podían erigirse dentro de estados soberanos como Georgia. Todo esto, por supuesto, giraba en torno al tema más amplio del despojo de los nativos americanos y quién era el legítimo propietario de la tierra. Este problema ideológico, y hasta cierto punto legal, sigue sin resolverse.

Una variedad de otros incidentes en la vida y carrera de Jackson exponen la naturaleza de su relación con la ley y la Constitución: el hecho de que él era un abogado que participó en un duelo de sus acciones durante la Crisis de Anulación y su incumplimiento como presidente de las pautas federales relativas al correo. Entrega de propaganda abolicionista. La mayoría encaja dentro de su concepción más amplia del deber, el honor y lo que era necesario para la santidad de la Unión. La ideología de Jackson sigue siendo tan controvertida ahora como lo fue en su propio tiempo. Hay pocas respuestas fáciles. Sin embargo, esto es lo que hace que las opiniones y la conducta de Jackson sean tan relevantes hoy en día. Cuando se les presenta la historia de Jackson, los estudiantes invariablemente se dividen por la mitad sobre si su conducta estaba justificada, independientemente de la legalidad. En este sentido, Jackson sigue sirviendo como una importante fuente de reflexión al considerar cómo debería y no debería actuar Estados Unidos en materia de seguridad nacional.

Matthew Warshauer es profesor de historia en la Central Connecticut State University y autor de Andrew Jackson en contexto (2009) y Andrew Jackson y la política de la ley marcial: nacionalismo, libertades civiles y partidismo (2006).


Andrew Jackson - Mejoras internas

La expulsión de los indios mostró que el objetivo de Jackson de asegurar una sociedad virtuosa pero progresista estaba circunscrito por la raza. Al mismo tiempo, aclaró otros aspectos de su programa al revertir la tendencia hacia una mayor asistencia federal para mejoras internas. En su primer mensaje anual en diciembre de 1829, Jackson llamó la atención del Congreso al anunciar que muchas personas consideraban la política anterior inconstitucional o inadecuada. "La gente esperaba reforma, reducción y economía en la administración del Gobierno", explicó en privado. "Este fue el grito de Maine a Louisiana, y en lugar de estos los objetos del Congreso, parecería , es hacer de la mía una de las administraciones más extravagantes desde el comienzo del Gobierno ".

Atascado en el asunto Eaton, la expulsión de indios y otros asuntos, Jackson dejó que Van Buren eligiera una medida adecuada para iniciar su nueva política. Van Buren esperó hasta abril de 1830, cuando un congresista de Kentucky presentó un proyecto de ley que pedía al gobierno federal que comprara acciones de una corporación para construir una carretera en Kentucky de Maysville a Lexington. Maysville Road fue considerada por sus defensores como parte de un sistema de carreteras interestatales más extenso y, por lo tanto, merece el apoyo federal. El proyecto de ley fue aprobado fácilmente por la Cámara de Representantes a fines de abril, con el respaldo de muchos hombres de Jackson. Van Buren luego llamó la atención de Jackson durante uno de sus paseos diarios a caballo, y Jackson aceptó de inmediato que, dado que la carretera estaba ubicada completamente dentro de un estado, serviría admirablemente.

Circulaban rumores de que Jackson podría vetar el proyecto de ley de Maysville, y un grupo de demócratas occidentales apeló al representante Richard M. Johnson de Kentucky para que presentara su caso en el camino. Johnson explicó que la mejora era necesaria y que un veto dañaría gravemente al partido Jackson en Kentucky. Johnson se entusiasmó con su tema y exclamó dramáticamente: "¡General! Si esta mano fuera un yunque sobre el que descendiera el mazo del herrero y una mosca se posara sobre él a tiempo para recibir el golpe, no lo aplastaría con más eficacia que aplastarás a tus amigos en Kentucky si vetas ese proyecto de ley ".

Jackson se puso de pie y respondió con un lenguaje igualmente ferviente, remarcando sin rodeos que "no había dinero" para los gastos deseados por los amigos de las mejoras internas. "¿Está usted dispuesto, están mis amigos dispuestos a poner impuestos para pagar las mejoras internas? ¡Por estar seguro de que no pediré prestado ni un centavo excepto en caso de absoluta necesidad!" proclamó acaloradamente. Jackson pronto terminó la entrevista con una nota más amistosa, prometiendo examinar el proyecto de ley desde todos los ángulos antes de tomar una decisión, pero Johnson dejó la Casa Blanca convencido de que el proyecto de ley estaba casi muerto. "Nada menos que una voz del cielo evitaría que el anciano vete el proyecto de ley", explicó Johnson a sus colegas, y "¡dudaba de que así fuera!".

Johnson tenía razón, porque Jackson emitió su veto, rechazando el proyecto de ley por motivos constitucionales y pragmáticos. Afirmando que las mejoras internas podrían apropiarse constitucionalmente sólo para propósitos de defensa nacional y beneficio nacional, Jackson condenó la medida como "de carácter puramente local". También argumentó hábilmente en contra de la conveniencia de tales propuestas, incluso si caían dentro de su norma constitucional. Recordando la responsabilidad estadounidense de perpetuar "el principio republicano", Jackson instó a aliviar las cargas públicas, poner fin a los gastos derrochadores y eliminar la corrupción y los privilegios especiales asociados con la inversión gubernamental en corporaciones privadas.

Durante los ocho años de su presidencia, Jackson elaboró ​​y refinó sus objeciones a los proyectos de mejoras internas. Advirtió que la participación federal corría el riesgo de enfrentamientos jurisdiccionales con los estados y que la inversión del gobierno en empresas de transporte privadas delegaba responsabilidades públicas a agencias privadas y conducía a acusaciones de "favoritismo y opresión". También protestó contra el "banderillero" que fomentaba las desigualdades de cargas y beneficios y era destructivo para la armonía legislativa. Jackson no estaba en contra del progreso económico, pero sostenía que las demandas de un extenso sistema de mejoras patrocinado por el gobierno federal ponían en peligro al gobierno republicano y distorsionaban el crecimiento económico natural.

El gasto en mejoras internas no cesó durante la administración de Jackson. De hecho, gastó más dinero, alrededor de $ 10 millones, que todas las administraciones anteriores juntas. Pero dada la presión para mejorar las comunicaciones y las instalaciones de transporte puestas en todos los niveles del gobierno por la expansión económica, la evidencia del compromiso de Jackson con la moderación se puede encontrar en la falta de nuevas propuestas que emanan de su administración y el desánimo de nuevos proyectos favoritos causados ​​por proyectos reales o vetos amenazados. La mayor parte del dinero aprobado por Jackson fue para proyectos ya iniciados bajo administraciones anteriores o actividades y lugares que estaban claramente bajo jurisdicción federal. Por lo tanto, Jackson detuvo el impulso de un sistema nacional de mejoras y ubicó la responsabilidad principal de los proyectos en los gobiernos estatales y locales y en la financiación privada.

Más que el proyecto de ley de remoción de indios, la política de mejoras internas de Jackson inició el proceso de identificar a los seguidores de Jackson con una plataforma de partido. El propio Jackson transmitió la idea de que su posición sobre las mejoras internas era un campo de pruebas para las divisiones partidarias emergentes. "La línea ... ha sido bastante trazada", anunció después de emitir el mensaje de Maysville.

El veto también marcó un cambio significativo en el poder presidencial. Antes de la presidencia de Jackson, sólo se había recurrido al veto nueve veces, generalmente por motivos de inconstitucionalidad o para proteger al ejecutivo contra la usurpación legislativa. Jackson ejerció el veto en más ocasiones, un total de doce veces empleó frecuentemente el veto de bolsillo, por el cual un presidente retiene un proyecto de ley, sin firmar, hasta que el Congreso levanta la sesión y amplía los motivos para vetar una medida. De hecho, fueron las partes de los mensajes de veto de Jackson que trataban de asuntos no constitucionales las que por lo general contenían los ejemplos más auténticos de la retórica jacksoniana y tenían el mayor atractivo popular. Además, al dirigir sus vetos al pueblo, Jackson aumentó el poder presidencial y convirtió al director ejecutivo en sustancialmente el equivalente de ambas cámaras del Congreso.


Los gobiernos estatales se hacen cargo

Con el gobierno federal temporalmente fuera de escena, los gobiernos estatales tomaron la antorcha de las mejoras internas. Nueva York fue el primer estado en emprender un proyecto de mejora interna masiva con sus propios fondos públicos. En 1817, la legislatura autorizó la construcción del Canal Erie, que iba desde el río Hudson hasta Buffalo en el lago Erie, bajo la atenta mirada del gobernador del estado, DeWitt Clinton. Los críticos del plan pensaron que nunca tendría éxito y se refirieron al proyecto como "El gran foso de Clinton". Pero en 1825, solo ocho años después de que comenzaran los trabajos en el proyecto, se terminó el Canal Erie. Los frutos del esfuerzo fueron impresionantes e inmediatos. En el primer año de su operación, los ingresos por peajes en el Canal Erie superaron el interés anual sobre la deuda de construcción del estado, ya que el tráfico en la mejora varió desde carga pesada que incluye madera y trigo hasta pequeños objetos de valor manufacturados y pasajeros que utilizan el canal para un transporte rápido y ocio. Para 1837, los ingresos del Canal Erie habían borrado completamente la deuda de construcción de Nueva York, solo doce años después de comenzar a operar. La vía fluvial acortó considerablemente el tiempo y los gastos necesarios para el transporte de productos básicos a granel y de alto valor y también abrió de manera efectiva los condados occidentales de Nueva York para el desarrollo de las ciudades en crecimiento de Buffalo, Syracuse y Rochester que prosperaron desde la frontera con el Canal Erie. Además, como proyecto de obras públicas construido por el gobierno del estado de Nueva York, el Canal Erie demostró el beneficio potencial que podría proporcionar una red de mejora interna financiada por el estado.

Muchos estados se apresuraron a copiar el éxito de Nueva York con el Canal Erie. Durante la década de 1820, el estado de Virginia se hizo cargo del proyecto del río James y el canal Kanawha, que fue diseñado para cruzar las montañas y enriquecer los condados del interior a lo largo del camino. En 1826, Pennsylvania decidió construir un sistema estatal de canales troncales y secundarios, comúnmente conocido como State Works. Incluso los estados al oeste de las Montañas Apalaches como Ohio, Indiana e Illinois se apresuraron a construir sus propios sistemas, y durante la década de 1830 un boom de canales en toda regla se apoderó de los Estados Unidos. Pero tan pronto como se iniciaron muchos de estos proyectos, comenzaron a ver rendimientos decrecientes. Debido a que muchos proyectos de canales se inspiraron más en la conveniencia política que en una perspectiva real de una mayor eficiencia económica, perdieron dinero.

Además de construir estos caminos ellos mismos, los estados también contrataron compañías de transporte que proporcionaron fondos para otras empresas. Probablemente el ejemplo más famoso de esto es el ferrocarril de Baltimore y Ohio. En 1827, un grupo de comerciantes de Baltimore se reunió para discutir ideas sobre una línea central de mejoras para Maryland. Observaron el caso de Nueva York y Pensilvania al norte y Virginia al sur y vieron que todos estos estados estaban planeando sistemas de canales masivos para ayudar al desarrollo de sus condados del interior. Dado que Maryland no tenía un sistema fluvial considerable para expandirse como el río Hudson en Nueva York o el río James en Virginia, decidieron experimentar con una nueva forma de transporte conocida como ferrocarril. Estos comerciantes solicitaron a la legislatura un estatuto, y en febrero de 1827 se creó el ferrocarril de Baltimore y Ohio con un capital social de $ 3 millones. Pero más importante, de las treinta mil acciones de la compañía de $ 100, el estado suscribió diez mil, por $ 1 millón. A cambio de los derechos de dominio eminente y la exención de impuestos, la legislatura de Maryland recibió el derecho a establecer tarifas de pasajeros y flete. Los ferrocarriles, como las autopistas de peaje, serían construidos por empresas privadas, pero a menudo con un respaldo financiero público limitado.


Democracia jacksoniana

Un concepto ambiguo y controvertido, Jacksonian Democracy en el sentido más estricto se refiere simplemente al ascendiente de Andrew Jackson y el Partido Demócrata después de 1828. Más libremente, alude a toda la gama de reformas democráticas que se llevaron a cabo junto con los Jacksonianos & # x2019 triunfo & # x2014 de la expansión el sufragio para reestructurar las instituciones federales. Sin embargo, desde otro ángulo, el jacksonianismo aparece como un impulso político ligado a la esclavitud, la subyugación de los nativos americanos y la celebración de la supremacía blanca, tanto que algunos académicos han descartado la frase & # x201CJacksonian Democracy & # x201D como una contradicción de términos. .

Tal revisionismo tendencioso puede proporcionar un correctivo útil para evaluaciones entusiastas más antiguas, pero no logra capturar una tragedia histórica más grande: la Democracia Jacksoniana fue un movimiento democrático auténtico, dedicado a ideales poderosos, a veces radicales, igualitarios, pero principalmente para los hombres blancos.

Social e intelectualmente, el movimiento jacksoniano no representaba la insurgencia de una clase o región específica, sino una coalición nacional diversa, a veces irritable. Sus orígenes se remontan a los movimientos democráticos de la Revolución Americana, los antifederalistas de las décadas de 1780 y 1790 y los republicanos demócratas de Jefferson. Más directamente, surgió de los profundos cambios sociales y económicos de principios del siglo XIX.

Historiadores recientes han analizado estos cambios en términos de una revolución de mercado. En el noreste y el viejo noroeste, las rápidas mejoras en el transporte y la inmigración aceleraron el colapso de una economía artesanal y campesina más antigua y su sustitución por la agricultura de cultivos comerciales y la fabricación capitalista. En el sur, el boom algodonero revivió una decadente economía esclavista de las plantaciones, que se extendió hasta ocupar las mejores tierras de la región. En Occidente, la incautación de tierras a los nativos americanos y los hispanos de sangre mixta abrió nuevas áreas para el asentamiento y el cultivo de los blancos y para la especulación.

No todos se beneficiaron por igual de la revolución del mercado, y mucho menos aquellos que no eran blancos para quienes fue un desastre absoluto. El jacksonianismo, sin embargo, crecería directamente a partir de las tensiones que generó dentro de la sociedad blanca. Los agricultores hipotecarios y un proletariado emergente en el noreste, no esclavistas en el sur, arrendatarios y futuros labradores en Occidente & # x2014 todos tenían razones para pensar que la expansión del comercio y el capitalismo traería no oportunidades ilimitadas sino nuevas formas de dependencia. Y en todas las secciones del país, algunos de los empresarios emergentes de la revolución del mercado sospechaban que las élites más viejas bloquearían su camino y darían forma al desarrollo económico a su medida.

En la década de 1820, estas tensiones alimentaron una crisis multifacética de fe política. Para frustración tanto de los hombres que se hicieron a sí mismos como de los plebeyos, ciertas suposiciones republicanas elitistas del siglo XVIII se mantuvieron firmes, especialmente en los estados costeros, que exigían que el gobierno se dejara en manos de una aristocracia natural de caballeros virtuosos y propietarios. Al mismo tiempo, algunas de las formas que se avecinaban del capitalismo del siglo XIX, las corporaciones autorizadas, los bancos comerciales y otras instituciones privadas, presagiaban la consolidación de un nuevo tipo de aristocracia adinerada. Y cada vez más después de la guerra de 1812, la política gubernamental parecía combinar lo peor de lo antiguo y lo nuevo, favoreciendo los tipos de formas de desarrollo económico centralizadas, amplias, construccionistas y de arriba hacia abajo que muchos pensaban que ayudarían a los hombres de medios establecidos al mismo tiempo que profundizarían las desigualdades entre ellos. ropa blanca. Numerosos eventos durante y después de la mal llamada Era de los Buenos Sentimientos & # x2014 entre ellos los fallos neofederalistas de John Marshall & # x2019s Corte Suprema, los efectos devastadores del pánico de 1819, el lanzamiento de John Quincy Adams & # x2019s y Henry Clay & # x2019s American System & # x2014 confirmó la creciente impresión de que el poder fluía constantemente hacia las manos de una pequeña minoría segura de sí misma.

Las curas propuestas para esta enfermedad incluían más democracia y una reorientación de la política económica. En los estados más antiguos, los reformadores lucharon para reducir o abolir los requisitos de propiedad para votar y ocupar cargos públicos, y para igualar la representación. Una nueva generación de políticos rompió con la vieja animadversión republicana contra los partidos políticos de masas. Los trabajadores urbanos formaron movimientos laborales y exigieron reformas políticas. Los sureños buscaban tarifas bajas, un mayor respeto por los derechos de los estados y # x2019, y un regreso al construccionismo estricto. Los occidentales clamaban por más tierras más baratas y por alivio de los acreedores, especuladores y banqueros (sobre todo, el odiado Segundo Banco de los Estados Unidos).

Ha confundido a algunos académicos que gran parte de este fermento finalmente se uniera detrás de Andrew Jackson, un antiguo especulador de tierras, oponente del alivio de los deudores y ferviente nacionalista en tiempos de guerra. Sin embargo, en la década de 1820, las experiencias comerciales personales de Jackson habían alterado hacía mucho tiempo sus opiniones sobre la especulación y el papel moneda, dejándolo eternamente sospechoso del sistema crediticio en general y de los bancos en particular. Su carrera como luchador indio y conquistador de los británicos lo convirtió en un héroe popular, especialmente entre los colonos hambrientos de tierras. Su entusiasmo por los programas nacionalistas había disminuido después de 1815, a medida que las amenazas extranjeras retrocedían y las dificultades económicas se multiplicaban. Sobre todo, Jackson, con sus propios orígenes duros, personificaba el desprecio por el viejo elitismo republicano, con su deferencia jerárquica y su recelo por la democracia popular.

Después de perder las elecciones presidenciales & # x201Ccorrupt del trato & # x201D de 1824, Jackson amplió su base política en el sur y el sur medio, reuniendo muchas corrientes de descontento de todo el país. Pero al desafiar con éxito al presidente John Quincy Adams en 1828, los partidarios de Jackson y # x2019s jugaron principalmente con su imagen como un guerrero varonil, enmarcando la contienda como una entre Adams que podía escribir y Jackson que podía pelear. Solo después de tomar el poder, la Democracia Jacksoniana refinó su política e ideología. De esa autodefinición surgió un cambio fundamental en los términos del debate político nacional.

El impulso político básico de los jacksonianos, tanto en Washington como en los estados, fue librar al gobierno de los prejuicios de clase y desmantelar los motores de arriba hacia abajo, impulsados ​​por el crédito, de la revolución del mercado. La guerra contra el Segundo Banco de los Estados Unidos y las subsecuentes iniciativas de dinero duro marcaron la pauta de un esfuerzo inquebrantable para sacar las manos de unos pocos banqueros privados ricos y no elegidos de las palancas de la economía de la nación. Bajo los jacksonianos, las mejoras internas patrocinadas por el gobierno generalmente cayeron en desgracia, sobre la base de que eran expansiones innecesarias del poder centralizado, beneficiosas principalmente para los hombres con conexiones. Los jacksonianos defendieron la rotación en el cargo como un solvente para el elitismo arraigado. Para ayudar a los agricultores y plantadores en apuros, siguieron un programa implacable (algunos dicen que inconstitucional) de expulsión de indios, al tiempo que respaldaban los precios baratos de la tierra y los derechos de preferencia de los colonos.

En torno a estas políticas, los líderes de Jackson construyeron una ideología democrática dirigida principalmente a los votantes que se sintieron heridos o aislados de la revolución del mercado. Actualizando las piezas más democráticas del legado republicano, postularon que ninguna república podría sobrevivir mucho tiempo sin una ciudadanía de hombres económicamente independientes. Desafortunadamente, afirmaron, ese estado de independencia republicana era extremadamente frágil. Según los jacksonianos, toda la historia de la humanidad había implicado una lucha entre unos pocos y muchos, instigada por una minoría codiciosa de riquezas y privilegios que esperaba explotar a la gran mayoría. Y esta lucha, declararon, estaba detrás de los principales problemas del momento, ya que la & # x201Riqueza asociada & # x201D de Estados Unidos buscaba aumentar su dominio.

Las mejores armas del pueblo eran la igualdad de derechos y el gobierno limitado, asegurándose de que las clases ya ricas y favorecidas no se enriquecieran más al apoderarse, ampliar y luego saquear las instituciones públicas. En términos más generales, los jacksonianos proclamaron una cultura política basada en la igualdad de los hombres blancos, en contraste con otros movimientos de reforma autodenominados. El nativismo, por ejemplo, les pareció una odiosa manifestación del puritanismo elitista. Los sabadistas, los defensores de la templanza y otros aspirantes a levantadores de la moral, insistieron, no deberían imponer la justicia a los demás. Beyond position-taking, the Jacksonians propounded a social vision in which any white man would have the chance to secure his economic independence, would be free to live as he saw fit, under a system of laws and representative government utterly cleansed of privilege.

As Jacksonian leaders developed these arguments, they roused a noisy opposition—some of it coming from elements of the coalition that originally elected Jackson president. Reactionary southern planters, centered in South Carolina, worried that the Jacksonians’ egalitarianism might endanger their own prerogatives𠅊nd perhaps the institution of slavery—if southern nonslaveholders carried them too far. They also feared that Jackson, their supposed champion, lacked sufficient vigilance in protecting their interests�rs that provoked the nullification crisis in 1832-1833 and Jackson’s crushing of extremist threats to federal authority. A broader southern opposition emerged in the late 1830s, mainly among wealthy planters alienated by the disastrous panic of 1837 and suspicious of Jackson’s successor, the Yankee Martin Van Buren. In the rest of the country, meanwhile, the Jacksonian leadership’s continuing hard-money, antibank campaigns offended more conservative men—the so-called Bank Democrats—who, whatever their displeasure with the Second Bank of the United States, did not want to see the entire paper money credit system dramatically curtailed.

The oppositionist core, however, came from a cross-class coalition, strongest in rapidly commercializing areas, that viewed the market revolution as the embodiment of civilized progress. Far from pitting the few against the many, oppositionists argued, carefully guided economic growth would provide more for everyone. Government encouragement—in the form of tariffs, internal improvements, a strong national bank, and aid to a wide range of benevolent institutions—was essential to that growth. Powerfully influenced by the evangelical Second Great Awakening, core oppositionists saw in moral reform not a threat to individual independence but an idealistic cooperative effort to relieve human degradation and further expand the store of national wealth. Eager to build up the country as it already existed, they were cool to territorial expansion. Angered by Jackson’s large claims for presidential power and rotation in office, they charged that the Jacksonians had brought corruption and executive tyranny, not democracy. Above all, they believed that personal rectitude and industriousness, not alleged political inequalities, dictated men’s failures or successes. The Jacksonians, with their spurious class rhetoric, menaced that natural harmony of interests between rich and poor which, if only left alone, would eventually bring widespread prosperity.

By 1840, both the Jacksonian Democracy and its opposite (now organized as the Whig party) had built formidable national followings and had turned politics into a debate over the market revolution itself. Yet less than a decade later, sectional contests linked to slavery promised to drown out that debate and fracture both major parties. In large measure, that turnabout derived from the racial exclusiveness of the Jacksonians’ democratic vision.

The Jacksonian mainstream, so insistent on the equality of white men, took racism for granted. To be sure, there were key radical exceptions—people like Frances Wright and Robert Dale Owen—who were drawn to the Democracy’s cause. North and South, the democratic reforms achieved by plebeian whites𠅎specially those respecting voting and representation�me at the direct expense of free blacks. Although informed by constitutional principles and genuine paternalist concern, the Jacksonian rationale for territorial expansion assumed that Indians (and, in some areas, Hispanics) were lesser peoples. As for slavery, the Jacksonians were determined, on both practical and ideological grounds, to keep the issue out of national affairs. Few mainstream Jacksonians had moral qualms about black enslavement or any desire to meddle with it where it existed. More important, they believed that the mounting antislavery agitation would distract attention from the artificial inequalities among white men and upset the party’s delicate intersectional alliances. Deep down, many suspected that the slavery issue was but a smokescreen thrown up by disgruntled elitists looking to regain the initiative from the real people’s cause.

Through the 1830s and 1840s, the mainstream Jacksonian leadership, correctly confident that their views matched those of the white majority, fought to keep the United States a democracy free from the slavery question𠅌ondemning abolitionists as fomenters of rebellion, curtailing abolitionist mail campaigns, enforcing the congressional gag rule that squelched debate on abolitionist petitions, while fending off the more extremist proslavery southerners. In all of this fighting, however, the Jacksonians also began to run afoul of their professions about white egalitarianism. Opposing antislavery was one thing silencing the heretics with gag rules amounted to tampering with white people’s equal rights. More important, Jacksonian proexpansionism—what one friendly periodical, the Democratic Review boosted as “manifest destiny”—only intensified sectional rifts. Slaveholders, quite naturally, thought they were entitled to see as much new territory as legally possible opened up to slavery. But that prospect appalled northern whites who had hoped to settle in lily white areas, untroubled by that peculiar institution whose presence (they believed) would degrade the status of white free labor.

It would take until the 1850s before these contradictions fully unraveled the Jacksonian coalition. But as early as the mid-1840s, during the debates over Texas annexation, the Mexican War, and the Wilmot Proviso, sectional cleavages had grown ominous. The presidential candidacy of Martin Van Buren on the Free-Soil ticket in 1848𠅊 protest against growing southern power within the Democracy𠅊mply symbolized northern Democratic alienation. Southern slaveholder Democrats, for their part, began to wonder if anything short of positive federal protection for slavery would spell doom for their class𠅊nd the white man’s republic. In the middle remained a battered Jacksonian mainstream, ever hopeful that by raising the old issues, avoiding slavery, and resorting to the language of popular sovereignty, the party and the nation might be held together. Led by men like Stephen A. Douglas, these mainstream compromisers held sway into the mid-1850s, but at the cost of constant appeasement of southern concerns, further exacerbating sectional turmoil. Jacksonian Democracy was buried at Fort Sumter, but it had died many years earlier.


24e. Jackson vs. Clay and Calhoun


Andrew Jackson viewed Henry Clay, the Great Compromiser, as opportunistic, ambitious, and untrustworthy.

Henry Clay was viewed by Jackson as politically untrustworthy, an opportunistic, ambitious and self-aggrandizing man. He believed that Clay would compromise the essentials of American republican democracy to advance his own self-serving objectives. Jackson also developed a political rivalry with his Vice-President, John C. Calhoun. Throughout his term, Jackson waged political and personal war with these men, defeating Clay in the Presidential election of 1832 and leading Calhoun to resign as Vice-President.

Jackson's personal animosity towards Clay seems to have originated in 1819, when Clay denounced Jackson for his unauthorized invasion of Spanish West Florida in the previous year. Clay was also instrumental in John Quincy Adams's winning the Presidency from Jackson in 1824, when neither man had a majority and the election was thrown into the House of Representatives. Adams' appointment of Clay as Secretary of State confirmed Jackson's opinion that the Presidential election has been thrown to Adams as part of a corrupt and unprincipled bargain.

Clay was called The Great Compromiser , and served in the Congress starting in 1806. He had a grand strategic vision called the American System. This was a federal government initiative to foster national growth though protective tariffs, internal improvements and the Bank of the United States. Clay was unswerving in his support for internal improvements, which primarily meant federally funded roads and canals. Jackson believed the American System to be unconstitutional &mdash could federal funds be used to build roads? He vetoed the Maysville Road Bill , Clay's attempt to fund internal improvements. His veto of the Bank Recharter Bill drove the two further apart.


Calhoun and Jackson held separate views on many issues, including states' rights.

Jackson's personal animosity for Calhoun seems to have had its origin in the Washington "social scene" of the time. Jackson's feelings were inflamed by the Mrs. Calhoun's treatment of Peggy, wife of Jackson's Secretary of War, John Eaton . Mrs. Calhoun and other wives and daughters of several cabinet officers refused to attend social gatherings and state dinners to which Mrs. Eaton had been invited because they considered her of a lower social station and gossiped about her private life. Jackson, reminded of how rudely his own wife Rachel was treated, defended Mrs. Eaton.

Many political issues separated Jackson from Calhoun, his Vice President. One was the issue of states rights. Hoping for sympathy from President Jackson, Calhoun and the other states-rights party members sought to trap Jackson into a pro-states-rights public pronouncement at a Jefferson birthday celebration in April 1832. Some of the guests gave toasts which sought to establish a connection between a states-rights view of government and nullification. Finally, Jackson's turn to give a toast came, and he rose and challenged those present, " Our Federal Union &mdash It must be preserved ." Calhoun then rose and stated, "The Union &mdash next to our liberty, the most dear!" Jackson had humiliated Calhoun in public. The nullification crisis that would follow served as the last straw. Jackson proved that he was unafraid to stare down his enemies, no matter what position they might hold.


Andrew Jackson: Domestic Affairs

Jackson entered the White House with an uncertain policy agenda beyond a vague craving for "reform" (or revenge) and a determination to settle relationships between the states and the Indian tribes within their borders. On these two matters he moved quickly and decisively.

During the campaign, Jackson had charged the Adams bureaucracy with fraud and with working against his election. As President, he initiated sweeping removals among highranking government officials—Washington bureau chiefs, land and customs officers, and federal marshals and attorneys. Jackson claimed to be purging the corruption, laxity, and arrogance that came with long tenure, and restoring the opportunity for government service to the citizenry at large through "rotation in office." But haste and gullibility did much to confuse his purpose.

Under the guise of reform, many offices were doled out as rewards for political services. Newspaper editors who had championed Jackson's cause, some of them very unsavory characters, came in for special favor. His most appalling appointee was an old army comrade and political sycophant named Samuel Swartwout. Against all advice, Jackson made him collector of the New York City customhouse, where the government collected nearly half its annual revenue. In 1838, Swartwout absconded with more than $1 million, a staggering sum for that day. Jackson denied that political criteria motivated his appointments, claiming honesty and efficiency as his only goals. Yet he accepted an officeholder's support for Adams as evidence of unfitness, and in choosing replacements he relied exclusively on recommendations from his own partisans. A Jackson senator from New York, William L. Marcy, defended Jackson's removals by proclaiming frankly in 1832 that in politics as in war, "to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy." Jackson was never so candid—or so cynical. Creating the "spoils system" of partisan manipulation of the patronage was not his conscious intention. Still, it was his doing.

Indian Removal

Indian nations had been largely erased or removed from the northeastern United States by the time Jackson became President. But in the southwest, the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks still occupied large portions of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee. For many years, Jackson had protested the practice of treating with Indian tribes as if they were foreign nations. Jackson did not hate Indians as a race. He was friendly with many individual Indians and had taken home an Indian orphan from the Creek campaign to raise in his household as a companion to his adopted son. But Jackson did believe that Indian civilization was lower than that of whites, and that for their own survival, tribes who were pressed by white settlement must assimilate as individuals or remove to the west out of harm's way. Confident that he could judge the Indians' true welfare better than they, Jackson, when employed as an Indian negotiator in his army years, had often used threats and bribery to procure cessions of land. Formalities notwithstanding, he regarded tribes resident within the states not as independent sovereign entities but as wards of the government and tenants-at-will.

The inherent conflict between tribal and state authority came to a head just as Jackson assumed office. The Cherokee nation had acquired many of the attributes of white civilization, including a written language, a newspaper, and a constitution of government. Under its treaties with the federal government, the tribe claimed sovereign authority over its territory in Georgia and adjoining states. Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi countered by asserting state jurisdiction over their Indian domains.

Jackson backed the states. He maintained that the federal government had no right to defend the Cherokees against Georgia's encroachments. If the Indians wished to maintain their tribal government and landownership, they must remove beyond the existing states. To facilitate the removal, Jackson induced Congress in 1830 to pass a bill empowering him to lay off new Indian homelands west of the Mississippi, exchange them for current tribal holdings, purchase the Indians' capital improvements, and pay the costs of their westward transportation. This Indian Removal Act was the only major piece of legislation passed at Jackson's behest in his eight years as President.

Indian removal was so important to Jackson that he returned to Tennessee to conduct the first negotiations in person. He gave the Indians a simple alternative: submit to state authority or emigrate beyond the Mississippi. Offered generous aid on one hand and the threat of subjugation on the other, the Chickasaws and Choctaws submitted readily, the Creeks under duress. Only the Cherokees resisted to the bitter end. Tentatively in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia in 1831 and more forcefully in Worcester v. Georgia the next year, the Supreme Court upheld the tribes' independence from state authority. But these legal victories pointed out no practical course of resistance for the tribe to take. Tacitly encouraged by Jackson, Georgia ignored the rulings. Jackson cultivated a minority faction within the tribe, and signed a removal treaty with them in 1835. Though the vast majority of Cherokees rejected the treaty, those who refused to remove under its terms were finally rounded up and transplanted westward by military force in 1838, under Jackson's successor Martin Van Buren. The Cherokees' sufferings in this forced exodus became notorious as the "Trail of Tears."

Meanwhile, dozens of removal treaties closed out pockets of Indian settlement in other states and territories east of the Mississippi. A short military campaign on the upper Mississippi quelled resistance by Black Hawk's band of Sacs and Foxes in 1832, and in 1835 a long and bloody war to subdue the Seminoles in Florida began. Most of the tribes went without force.

Given the coercion that produced them, most of the removal treaties were fair and even generous. Their execution was miserable. Generally the treaties promised fair payment for the Indians' land and goods, safe transportation to the West and sustenance upon arrival, and protection for the property of those who chose to remain behind under state jurisdiction. These safeguards collapsed under pressure from corrupt contractors, unscrupulous traders, and white trespassers backed by state authority. Jackson's desire to economize and avoid trouble with the state governments further undercut federal efforts to protect the tribes. For this record he bore ultimate responsibility. Jackson did not countenance the abuses, but he did ignore them. Though usually a stickler for the precise letter of formal obligations, he made promises to the Indians that the government did not and perhaps could not fulfill.

The American System and the Maysville Road Veto

When Jackson took office, the leading controversies in Congress concerned the "American System" of economic development policies propounded by Henry Clay and furthered by the previous Adams administration. As a senator in 1824, Jackson had backed the System's twin pillars of a protective tariff to foster domestic industry and federal subsidies for transportation projects (known as "internal improvements"). These policies were especially popular in the country's mid-section, from Pennsylvania west through Ohio to Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri. They were widely hated in much of the South, where they were regarded as devices to siphon wealth from cotton planters to northern manufacturers.

Many Americans judged the American System by its impact on their local interests. Jackson had supported it on national grounds, as a means to build the country's strength and secure its economic independence. Poor transportation in particular had hamstrung the American military effort in the War of 1812. But the unseemly scramble in Congress for favors and subsidies and the rising sectional acrimony over the tariff during the Adams presidency turned Jackson against the System. As a nationalist, he deplored sectional wrangling that threatened disunion, and he came to see protective tariffs and transportation subsidies as vehicles for corruption and for the advancement of special privilege.

Jackson announced his new policy by vetoing a bill to aid the Maysville Road in Kentucky in 1830. A string of similar vetoes followed, essentially halting federal internal improvement spending. Reversing himself on the tariff, Jackson renounced protection in 1831 and endorsed a reduction in rates. Invoking Jeffersonian precedent, he urged a return to simple, frugal, minimal government.

At the same time, Jackson reproved the increasingly strident Southern sectional opposition to the tariff headed by his own vice president, John C. Calhoun of South Carolina. Radical South Carolinians blamed the tariff for all their economic woes and misfortunes. They denounced it as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power, a measure to illegitimately channel wealth from South to North under the guise of an import tax. Drawing on the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions against the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798, Calhoun fashioned an argument that an individual state, acting through a formal convention, could interpose its authority to declare null and void any federal law that it deemed to violate the Constitution. Jackson thought this nullification doctrine treasonous and absurd. At a political dinner in 1830 he stamped his disapproval on it by staring at Calhoun and toasting, "Our federal Union: It must be preserved."

The Eaton Affair

Jackson was already becoming estranged from Calhoun over a simmering Washington scandal. Jackson's secretary of war, John Henry Eaton, was an old army comrade, Jackson's his campaign biographer, and a Tennessee neighbor. He was the President's one personal confidante in a cabinet made up of near-strangers. Just before the inauguration, Eaton had married Margaret O'Neale Timberlake, the vivacious daughter of a Washington hotelier. Scandalous stories circulated about "Peggy" O'Neale, whose first husband, a purser in the Navy, had died abroad under mysterious circumstances not long before her marriage to Eaton. Rumor said that he committed suicide over her dalliance with Eaton. Cabinet wives, including Calhoun's wife Floride, regarded Peggy with abhorrence and conspicuously shunned her.

In the snubbing of Mrs. Eaton, Jackson saw the kind of vicious persecution that he believed had hounded his own Rachel to her death. He also believed he spied a plot to drive out Eaton from his cabinet, isolate him among strangers, and control his administration. The master of the plot, Jackson came to decide, was Calhoun. He was also shown evidence that during the controversy over his Florida incursion back in 1818, Calhoun had criticized him in Monroe's cabinet while publicly posturing as his defender. Jackson now accused Calhoun of treachery, initiating an angry correspondence that ended with the severing of social relations between the two.

The Eaton scandal cleaved Jackson's own household. His niece, White House hostess Emily Tennessee Donelson, refused to associate with Mrs. Eaton, and Emily's husband, Jackson's nephew and private secretary Andrew Jackson Donelson, backed her up. The one cabinet officer who stood apart from the snubbing was a man with no wife to contend with—Secretary of State Martin Van Buren of New York, a widower. Jackson was drawn to Van Buren both by his courtliness to Peggy Eaton and his policy views. Van Buren wished to return to the minimalist, strict constructionist governing philosophy of the old Jeffersonian party. In practical political terms, he sought to rebuild the coalition of "planters and plain republicans"—put concretely, an alliance of the South with New York and Pennsylvania—that had sustained Jefferson. Van Buren opposed the American System, but on broad philosophical rather than narrow sectional grounds.

As Jackson separated from Calhoun, he became more intimate with Van Buren. By 1831, the Eaton imbroglio threatened to paralyze the administration. Eaton and Van Buren created a way out: they resigned, giving Jackson an occasion to demand the resignations of the other secretaries and appoint a whole new cabinet. To reward Van Buren, Jackson named him as minister to Great Britain, the highest post in the American diplomatic service. The nomination came before the Senate, where Vice-President Calhoun, on an arranged tie vote, cast the deciding vote against it. Van Buren, who had already assumed his station abroad, came home as a political martyr, Jackson's choice for vice-president in 1832, and his heir apparent to the presidency.

The Nullification Crisis and the Compromise of 1833

As Van Buren rose and Calhoun fell, the tariff controversy mounted to a crisis. Congress passed a new tariff in 1832 that reduced some rates but continued the protectionist principle. Some Southerners claimed this as a sign of progress, but South Carolinians saw it as reason to abandon hope in Washington. In November, a state convention declared the tariff unconstitutional and hence null and void. South Carolina's legislature followed up with measures to block the collection of federal custom revenues at the state's ports and to defend the state with arms against federal incursion.

Jackson responded on two fronts. He urged Congress to reduce the tariff further, but he also asked for strengthened authority to enforce the revenue laws. Privately, and perhaps for calculated political effect, he talked about marching an army into South Carolina and hanging Calhoun. In December, he issued a ringing official proclamation against nullification. Drafted largely by Secretary of State Edward Livingston, the document questioned Carolinians' obsession with the tariff, reminded them of their patriotic heritage, eviscerated the constitutional theory behind nullification, and warned against taking this fatal step: "Be not deceived by names. Disunion by armed force is treason. Are you really ready to incur its guilt?"While Jackson thundered, Congress scrambled for a solution that would avoid civil war. Henry Clay, leader of the congressional opposition to Jackson and stalwart of the American System, joined in odd alliance with John C. Calhoun, who had resigned his lame-duck vice-presidency for a seat in the Senate. They fashioned a bill to reduce the tariff in a series of stages over nine years. Early in 1833, Congress passed this Compromise Tariff and also a "force bill" to enforce the revenue laws. Though the Clay-Calhoun forces sought to deny Jackson credit for the settlement, he was fully satisfied with the result. South Carolina, claiming victory, rescinded its nullification of the tariff but nullified the force bill in a final gesture of principled defiance. The Compromise of 1833 brought an end to tariff agitation until the 1840s. First with internal improvements, then with the tariff, the American System had been essentially stymied.

The Bank Veto

The congressional Clay-Calhoun alliance foreshadowed a convergence of all Jackson's enemies into a new opposition party. The issue that sealed this coalition, solidified Jackson's own following, and dominated his second term as President was the Second Bank of the United States.

The Bank of the United States was a quasi-public corporation chartered by Congress to manage the federal government's finances and provide a sound national currency. Headquartered in Philadelphia with branches throughout the states, it was the country's only truly national financial institution. The federal government owned one-fifth of the stock and the President of the United States appointed one-fifth of the directors. Like other banks chartered by state legislatures, the Bank lent for profit and issued paper currency backed by specie reserves. Its notes were federal legal tender. By law, it was also the federal government's own banker, arranging its loans and storing, transferring, and disbursing its funds. The Bank's national reach and official status gave it enormous leverage over the state banks and over the country's supply of money and credit.

The original Bank of the United States was chartered in 1791 at the urging of Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. Opposition to it was one of the founding tenets of the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican party. That party allowed the Bank to expire when its twenty-year charter ran out in 1811. But the government's financial misadventures in the War of 1812 forced a reconsideration. In 1816, Congress chartered the Second Bank, again for twenty years.

Imprudent lending and corrupt management brought the Second Bank into deep disrepute during the speculative boom-and-bust cycle that culminated in the Panic of 1819. Calls arose for revocation of the charter. But the astute stewardship of new Bank president Nicholas Biddle did much to repair its reputation in the 1820s. By 1828, when Jackson was first elected, the Bank had ceased to be controversial. Indeed, most informed observers deemed it indispensable.

Startling his own supporters, Jackson attacked the Bank in his very first message to Congress in 1829. Biddle attempted to conciliate him, but Jackson's opposition to renewing the charter seemed immovable. He was convinced that the Bank was not only unconstitutional—as Jefferson and his followers had long maintained—but that its concentrated financial power represented a dire threat to popular liberty.

Under the advice of Senators Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, Biddle sought a congressional recharter in 1832. They calculated that Jackson would not dare issue a veto on the eve of the election if he did, they would make an issue of it in the campaign. The recharter bill duly passed Congress and on July 10, Jackson vetoed it.

The veto message was one of the defining documents of Jackson's presidency. Clearly intended for the public eye, parts of it read more like a political manifesto than a communication to Congress. Jackson recited his constitutional objections and introduced some dubious economic arguments, chiefly aimed at foreign ownership of Bank stock. But the crux of the message was its attack on the special privilege enjoyed by private stockholders in a government-chartered corporation. Jackson laid out an essentially laissez-faire vision of government as a neutral arbiter, phrased in a resonant populism:"It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to their selfish purposes. Distinctions in society will always exist under every just government. Equality of talents, of education, or of wealth can not be produced by human institutions. In the full enjoyment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and virtue, every man is equally entitled to protection by law but when the laws undertake to add to these natural and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers--who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their Government. There are no necessary evils in government. Its evils exist only in its abuses. If it would confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing."

Though some original Jackson men were flabbergasted and outraged at his turn against the Bank, the veto held up in Congress. It became the prime issue in the ensuing presidential campaign, with both sides distributing copies of Jackson's message. Jackson read his re-election as a mandate to pursue his attack on the Bank further.

Removal of the Deposits

As soon as the nullification crisis was resolved, Jackson took his next step. The Bank's open involvement in the presidential campaign convinced him more than ever of its inherent corruption. To draw its fangs until its charter ran out in 1836, he determined to withdraw the federal government's own deposits from the Bank and place them in selected state-chartered banks.

This was a maneuver requiring some delicacy. Under the charter, the secretary of the treasury, not the President, had authority to remove the deposits. He had also to explain his reasons to Congress, where the House of Representatives had just voted by a two-to-one margin that the deposits should stay where they were. Jackson canvassed his cabinet on removal. Most of them opposed it, but he got the support and arguments he needed from Attorney General Roger Taney. Jackson drew up a paper explaining his decision, read it to the cabinet, and ordered Treasury Secretary William John Duane to execute the removal. To Jackson's astonishment, Duane refused. He also refused to resign, so Jackson fired him and put Taney in his place. Taney ordered the removal, which was largely complete by the time Congress convened in December 1833.

Even many congressional foes of the Bank could not countenance Jackson's proceedings against it. He had defied Congress's intent, rode roughshod over the treasury secretary's statutory control over the public purse, and removed the public funds from the lawfully authorized, responsible hands of the Bank of the United States to an untried, unregulated, and perhaps wholly irresponsible collection of state banks. To many, Jackson seemed to regard himself as above the law.

Fortunately for Jackson, Bank president Nicholas Biddle over-reacted and played into his hands. Regarding the removal of deposits as a declaration of open war, Biddle determined to force a recharter by creating a financial panic. Loss of the deposits required some curtailment of the Bank's loans, but Biddle carried the contraction further than was necessary in a deliberate effort to squeeze businessmen into demanding a recharter. This manipulation of credit for political ends served only to discredit the Bank and to vindicate Jackson's strictures against it.

Congress did not even consider recharter, but it did lash out at Jackson. Clay men and Southern anti-tariffites could not agree on the American System they could not all agree on rechartering the Bank but they could unite in their outrage at Jackson's high-handed proceedings against it. In the 1833-1834 session, Jackson's congressional foes converged to form a new party. They took the name of Whigs, borrowed from Revolutionary-era American and British opponents of royal prerogative.

Whigs held a majority in the Senate. They rejected Jackson's nominees for government directors of the Bank of the United States, rejected Taney as secretary of the treasury, and in March 1834, adopted a resolution of censure against Jackson himself for assuming "authority and power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of both." Jackson protested the censure, arguing that the Senate had adopted the moral equivalent of an impeachment conviction without formal charges, without a trial, and without the necessary two-thirds vote. Led by Thomas Hart Benton, Jackson's defenders mounted a crusade to expunge the censure from the Senate journal. They succeeded in 1837, at the end of Jackson's presidency, after Democrats finally won majority control of the Senate.

Hard Money

The Bank, defeated, retired from the fray after the 1834 session. When its charter expired it accepted a new one from Pennsylvania and continued to operate as a state institution. Meanwhile, the state banks, cut loose from central restraint and gorged with federal funds, went on a lending spree that helped fuel a speculative boom in western lands. Everything came crashing down in the Panic of 1837, which broke just as Jackson retired from office. The ensuing depression plagued Martin Van Buren's presidency and lingered on into the 1840s.

Jackson's unsatisfactory experiment with the state banks helped drive his economic thinking toward more radical extremes. He renounced all banknote currency and demanded a return to the "hard money" of gold and silver. To that end, and to curb rampant speculation, he ordered the issuance of a "Specie Circular" in 1836 requiring payment in coin for western public lands. By the end of his presidency he was attacking all chartered corporations, including manufacturing concerns, turnpike and canal companies, and especially banks, as instruments of aristocratic privilege and engines of oppression. His Farewell Address in 1837, drafted largely by Taney, warned of an insidious "money power" that threatened to subvert American liberty.

Slavery and Abolition

During Jackson's presidency, the momentous question of slavery intruded forcefully into politics. Northern evangelical opponents of slavery known as abolitionists organized and began to bombard the nation and Congress with pleas and petitions to rid the republic of this great wrong. Defenders of slavery responded with denunciations and with violence. They demanded in the interest of public safety that criticism of slavery be not only answered, but silenced. Some, especially the South Carolina nullifiers, linked abolitionism to the tariff as part of a systematic campaign of Northern sectional oppression against the South.

There is nothing to show that Jackson ever pondered slavery as a fundamental moral question. Such thinking was not in his character: he was a man of action, not of philosophy. He grew up with the institution of slavery and accepted it uncritically. Like his neighbors, he bought and sold slaves and used them to work his plantation and wait on his needs. Jackson reacted to the abolitionist controversy in purely political terms. He perceived it as a threat to sectional harmony and to his own national Democratic party, and on that ground he condemned the agitation of both sides.

During Jackson's administration, Congress began adopting annual "gag rules" to keep discussion of abolition petitions off the House and Senate floor. In 1835, abolitionists sent thousands of antislavery tracts through the mails directly to southern clergy, officials, and prominent citizens. Many of these were never delivered, intercepted by southern postmasters or by angry mobs. Jackson and Postmaster General Amos Kendall approved their action. Jackson recommended federal suppression of "incendiary publications" and damned the abolitionists' "wicked attempts" to incite a slave rebellion. His Farewell Address in 1837 warned of the dangers of sectional fanaticism, both northern and southern.


Public

The Michigan Care Improvement Registry (MCIR) is an immunization database that documents immunizations given to Michiganders throughout life. The Michigan Care Improvement Registry (MCIR) was created in 1998 to collect reliable immunization information for children and make it accessible to authorized users. A 2006 change to the Michigan Public Health Code enabled the MCIR to transition from a childhood immunization registry to a lifespan registry including citizens of all ages in the MCIR.

MCIR benefits health care organizations, schools, licensed childcare programs, pharmacies and Michigan’s citizens by consolidating immunization information from multiple providers into a comprehensive immunization record. This consolidation reduces vaccine-preventable diseases and over-vaccination, allowing providers to view up-to-date patient immunization history in one system.

Health care providers are required to report immunizations shall report: ALL immunizations administered to every child born after December 31, 1993 and less than 20 years of age within 72 hours of administration. Visit for applicable laws.

How do I request a copy of my child or dependent’s State of Michigan Immunization Record?

How do I obtain a copy of my State of Michigan Immunization Record?

Your Doctor or your Local Health Department can print an Official State of Michigan Immunization Record for you. Alternately, you can request your record by mail/fax using this form. International requests debe include an email address. We cannot fax or phone internationally.


Jackson vs. Calhoun--Part 1

It has been rare in American political history for presidents and vice-presidents not to get along or like each other, but it has happened. John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon, and John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson are three pairs that come immediately to mind. However, the most contentious relationship between a chief executive and his backup might be the pair of President Andrew Jackson and Vice-president John C. Calhoun.

Jackson was a self-made man from the backwoods of Tennessee and a military hero. In 1828, he was elected president on a platform of political and financial reform and of protecting states' rights. Calhoun hailed from South Carolina aristocracy and would do anything to protect and defend his native state.

The relationship between Jackson and Calhoun got off to a bad start when shortly after the inaugural in 1829, Calhoun's wife, Flordie, refused to entertain or otherwise acknowledge Peggy Eaton, the wife of John Eaton. Eaton was a senator from Tennessee and a good friend of Jackson whom Jackson appointed as Secretary of War. Peggy Eaton's first husband, a sailor named Timberlake, died while on a Mediterranean cruise -- an assignment Eaton, as Secretary of War, had arranged. It is unclear whether Timberlake died of natural causes or whether he committed suicide upon learning of the affair between Eaton and Peggy, but the fact that he had been assigned to the cruise by the Secretary of War to get him out of the way was scandalous. What made matters worse, John and Peggy lived together while Timberlake was at sea and married just a short time after the sailor's death.

This behavior from a woman was absolutely unacceptable to Flordie Calhoun, so Flordie refused to invite her to the grand social functions a vice-president's wife was obliged to hold for the Washington elite. Flordie's actions caused many of the other wives of cabinet officials to follow suit.

This snub of Jackson's friend infuriated the President, especially after the ugly rumors that had been spread about him and his wife, Rachel, during the previous presidential campaign. A chill developed between Jackson and Calhoun, and Eaton eventually resigned his position in 1831. However, several years later, Jackson appointed Eaton governor of the Territory of Florida.

On the political front, Jackson and Calhoun sparred over internal improvements and states' rights. On the issue of internal improvements, Calhoun supported the use of federal monies to be used for the building of roads, canals, and anything else that would help link the different parts of the country, especially for the benefit of trade and commerce that may help South Carolina.

Jackson, on the other hand, while supporting some improvements with federal money, was strongly influenced by the opponents of internal improvements, especially by his Secretary of State, Martin van Buren. When Congress sent the Maysville Road Bill to Jackson for signing, a bill that would have had the Federal Government buying stock in a private company in Kentucky, Jackson vetoed it instead. His reason was simple and sound: since the Maysville Road Bill allocated money for a project that was solely in the state of Kentucky, and therefore would not benefit any state other than Kentucky, Jackson could not support it. He pulled out the veto stamp and used it.

In his veto message, Jackson said that since monies appropriated by Congress for the general good "have always been under the control of the general principle that the works which might be thus aided should be 'of a general, not local, national, not State,' character[,]" it would not be proper to pass the Maysville Road Bill. He further stated that since all the money would go to a project that was "exclusively within the limits of a State" it would set a bad precedent that "would of necessity lead to the subversion of the federal system&hellip."

But differences over social etiquette and pork barrel projects would be nothing compared to the fight in which Jackson and Calhoun were about to engage.


Elektratig


Having read several books with a Whig orientation recently, I thought that I needed to balance the scales by reading something with a Jacksonian emphasis. Looking over my library, I decided I should re-read Richard Ellis’s The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States’ Rights and the Nullification Crisis. I read the book about three years ago and remember liking it a lot at the same time, I was pretty sure that I had read it too early and without adequate background, and that a lot of it had gone over my head.

Although I am now only 35 or so pages in, I already know that I was right. In the opening pages alone, Professor Ellis briefly delivers insightful analyses of a number of issues including: the different “flavors” (my term) of states’ rights, and why traditional states’ righters could be adamantly opposed to nullification and secession, in theory as well as in practice procedural details concerning the Cherokee Indian cases ( Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia ) that explain why Andrew Jackson was not put in a position in which he had to choose between enforcing or not enforcing the Supreme Court’s order and the pre-history, as it were, of Andrew Jackson’s mixed feelings and mixed signals concerning the Second Bank of the United States before Henry Clay and Nicholas Biddle openly allied and pushed re-charter in 1832.

For purposes of this post, however, let me highlight one other topic that Professor Ellis raises: Jackson’s approach to internal improvements. The opening chapter contains the best analysis of the issue that I have seen.

Jackson famously vetoed the Maysville Road bill in 1830, denouncing federal funding of projects deemed to be local as unconstitutional. Critics have asserted that Jackson’s veto was arbitrary and based on spite (against Henry Clay), citing the fact that “the federal government spent more money on internal improvements during Jackson’s two administrations than during all the previous administrations combined.”

In just a couple of pages, Professor Ellis convincingly rebuts the charge and argues that Jackson’s “internal improvements policy appears to have been both effective and fairly consistent.” Among other things, Ellis dissects Jackson’s veto messages, which drew careful distinctions among different kinds of improvements. Funding for roads and canals, to which Jackson applied a more stringent test, was (with two exceptions I won’t go into here) largely confined to projects in the territories and the District of Columbia.

Jackson’s veto messages, in contrast, indicate that he believed that maritime projects were more likely to warrant federal involvement. De acuerdo con este entendimiento declarado, & # 8220 [e] l gasto [federal] más grande y más frecuente. . . estaba en faros y mejoras en ríos y puertos. & # 8221 Además, el profesor Ellis señala que los precios aumentaron más del 50% durante el período 1834-1837, por lo que comparar los gastos en dólares brutos con los de años anteriores es engañoso.


Ver el vídeo: Hivi ndivyo MICHAEL JACKSON ALIVY0UWAWA na DAKTARI wake wa KARIBU.